Links are a key means of linking and sharing information in the Internet space, and have a value-neutral nature. In general, the act of setting a link to a site where copyright infringement is posted is done after uploading the infringing material, that is, after the act of 'making available to the public'. It has been a conventional precedent that the responsibility for aiding in the infringement of the public transmission right due to the act of 'use and provide' is denied as it corresponds to informing the web location information or route. There were positive and critical views on these prior precedents, but the Supreme Court recently accepted the critical view through a decision by a general consensus decision, and if the culprit does not withdraw the posting by deleting the infringing post from the server, it will become a infringement. Since the criminal act of violating the right to public transmission has not ended due to the continued repetition of the criminal offense of providing access to members at a time and place individually selected by them, such criminal acts may be subject to aiding. In addition, considering the problem of excessive regulation on link behavior, the limit of establishment of aiding abetter was set in the case of commercial and continuous posting on internet sites. It is a judgment that considers the necessity and limitations of link behavior, and is considered to be a very important criterion both theoretically and practically in the future. However, the essence of copyright infringement by transmission needs to be viewed from the point of view of 'transmission' rather than 'making available to the public'. It is judged that such an interpretation direction is more consistent with existing precedents or has more legal validity. However, based on these interpretation standards, there is a limitation that the responsibility for aiding the act of 'making available to the public' without 'transmission' cannot be recognized, but it is a conclusion that must be accepted in light of the criminal justice system, other OSP responsibilities, and the general legal principle of aiding offenders. It would be appropriate to interpret the intellectual property rights, which is a product of legislative policy, to solve the problem of gaps in protection through legislation. In this regard, the question remains whether the target judgment was overly structured with the justification of the necessity of regulation on link setters. These issues should be dealt with in the review or analysis of the precedent.